


June 27, 2008 Board Control Seen Shifting to ShareholdersMartin Lipton of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, asks if the recent bout of shareholder activism has shifted the balance from director-centric governance to shareholder-centric governance in a new paper posted on the The Harvard Law School Blog.
Titled, “Shareholder Activism and the ‘Eclipse of the Public Corporation’: Is the Current Wave of Activism Causing Another Tectonic Shift in the American Corporate World,” Lipton addresses how today's uneasiness between shareholders and directors ultimately affects the global economy. He stresses that shareholders are interested in short-term gains, thus hurting long-term interests of the company.
Lipton, best-known as the father of the poison pill and an adviser to corporations on mergers, acquisitions, and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy, separated activists into two categories: hedge funds that target more profitable and financially healthy firms, and other entrepreneurial activists, who do not redirect investment strategies of their targeted firms.
Lipton advises directors to be, “vigilant, thorough, and proactive in seeking to balance short-term pressures against long-term goals.” He also explains how the tumultuous relationship between boards and shareholders affects the global economy.
The board-centric model of corporate governance is based on shareholders being confident with their board’s leadership abilities. The current distrust shareholders have toward their boards can ultimately cause competition with global competitors to suffer. American corporations cannot compete with emerging industries in foreign countries if shareholders and directors remain at odds.
Short-term or “short-sighted” stock gains by activist hedge funds make long-term investments in their businesses less attractive. Lipton writes that shareholders are short-sighted and are only interested in the short-term bottom line. It is the responsibility of directors to ensure that the company’s long-term investments reflect the company’s best interests.
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Comments:
Under the managerial form of governance that has been in dominant for most of Lipton's brilliant career, the board is composed of experts and operates primarily to provide internal technical advice. Under public governance, the board is composed of outside directors, shareowner interest groups and even more broadly defined stakeholders to link the corporation to mass markets and society... functions increasingly important for companies operating in a global context. Lipton's clients would be better served if he helped them adapt to the process of democratic deliberation, rather than fighting a rear guard action. How can they evolve to a system of selecting board members nominated by and directly accountable to shareowners? How can they supplement the annual meeting with an assembly of elected shareowners who provide advice to management throughout the year? By inviting public discussion in areas heretofore regarded as the exclusive domain of management, companies deliberate matters of public concern in advance and are less vulnerable to the vagaries of market bubbles and crashes. Lipton can best help his clients avoid the imposition of overly burdensome regulations by advising them on how to build democratic mechanisms into the very structures and processes of corporations themselves.
July 03, 2008 10:10 PM