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September 01, 2008

Learning From Failure

The coroner of failed businesses has some potentially lifesaving advice for boards.

Sydney Finkelstein is the coroner of the business world: He examines the wreckage of dead or dying companies to find out what happened. The professor at the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth is less interested in what executives do right, than in what they do wrong. Clearly, he thinks we can learn more from our blunders than from our triumphs. Finkelstein authored a book on the topic titled Why Smart Executives Fail. He sat down with Directorship to talk about how his studies can be applied to the current financial crisis and what we can learn from other people’s disasters.

 

So what are the main reasons that otherwise brilliant executives mess up?

One of the main drivers of failure that I found in my research is related to strategy, the assumptions that leaders make, and whether those assumptions are accurate or not. The reason I think it’s important to look at assumptions is that they are certainly something that boards can pay attention to and ask questions about. But also assumptions are, in some ways, the first principles of strategy.

 

Do executives tend to be overly optimistic in their assumptions? Do they fall in love with their own strategies?

There’s a natural tendency for all people to like to keep doing what they’ve been doing before if there’s been any degree of success in it. And sometimes if it hasn’t gone as well, they tend not to focus on some of those signals.

 

The world is changing and changing very quickly. My experience has been that not that many companies and senior executives are taking the time to say, “Well, are these assumptions that we put in place and are driving our strategy still relevant? They’ve been around for six months or a year or whatever their time frame might be. Are they still operative or has the world changed so much that we need to adjust?” These are exactly the questions a board member can ask: “What are the assumptions?” and “How do you know they’re still accurate?”

 

We hear all the time that the pace of change is speeding up. How true is that?

I think the best evidence that the pace of change is increasing, really accelerating, is to just look at the example of the companies in the Fortune 100. From 1955, when the list was started, to 1965, 80 of the 100 were still on the list. By 2005, there were only 18 of the top 100 still on that list. And from 1995 to 2005, 30 companies dropped off. That’s a huge attrition rate, and it has continued.

 

Are some of these companies blinded by their own success?

That’s another reason for failure that I call “the delusions around a dream company.” It refers to a successful organization, one that’s been hitting the numbers, but suddenly goes into decline. Because of its success, management begins to believe that it doesn’t have to pay as much attention to what’s going on around it. Executives begin to believe that they are the cause of success because they are so good. And what happens in those situations is really a lack of debate and discussion. This is absolutely what was going on at Enron. It was hitting the numbers, blowing past the numbers, and growing into one of the largest companies around—just a powerhouse. In part, because of the tremendous success of what was going on, the board got complacent. We have learned subsequently that, yes, there were a lot of things that the board was kept in the dark about, but the board also had all sorts of clues and signals about what was happening and didn’t pay attention to those because they really fell into this delusionary attitude that this was a superior company.

 

What are some of the red flags that something might be amiss?

I call it “keeping track of the lost signals” that exist all around. One of the questions I ask boards is: “Tell me about your early-warning system?” And I do not get very good answers. The most common answer that I get is, “Well, we look at our quarterly numbers and we see the trends and what’s happening.” And my response is, that’s kind of late in the game. If the problems are already playing out to the extent that they’ve hit the P&L and the balance sheet, you’re playing catch-up at that point. What are you doing to identify the problems that exist or potential problems that may exist ahead of time?

 

One of the biggest warning signs that companies need to be tracking is the extent to which key people in the organization are leaving. Yahoo is a good example: There’s been a steady flow of people out of Yahoo for a long time. Just the other day, some senior engineering/entrepreneurial types who had been acquired at an earlier time jumped ship. It’s a very powerful signal that something’s gone wrong.

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Tags: motorola (5) yahoo (45) mortgage crisis (4) ceos (7) risk management (28) (353)
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Comments:

 James Wall said:
Mr. Finkelstein makes some very useful observations and deserves our thanks. For a Board Member to stay ahead, not just abreast, of their company is indeed a challenge. There are likely as many ways of achieving this as there are Directors, and all involve something that too few Directors are willing to do: invest actual effort, as opposed to relying on ones past, and frequently outdated, experience; and being told by the executive team what to think. Those Directors that do invest more than adequate efforts are to be cherished; they likely see the issues coming right at them while the complacent are working on their golf game. An indicator of actual effort I use is if a Board is running the CEO and executive succession planning process or if it has been delegated to the CEO. It is demanding work, it requires getting to know the management team and one or two levels down to find those with the potential to become CEOs and provide the opportunities for them to develop and perhaps succeed. In that process you will learn a lot about the issues as seen from within the organization and not just the CEO and the few he wants you to talk with that agree with him. The process will provide the Director involved the context to challenge the core assumptions that Mr. Finkelstein discusses. So far, the score on Directors running succession planning seems to be about zero, which is quite surprising since as a species CEOs are like predators on the savanna that will drive off or kill (fire, in the case of a CEO) competitors, including their own young. Given executive egos and compensation, that is no wonder. Yet the cost to an organization of a failed succession plan is enormous – disruption as an outside search must be conducted, disappointment of internal candidates, distraction of management for an extended period as they adapt to a new leader and policies, susceptibility to competitor actions, and increased risk premium affixed by the market due to the risk of a new leader from outside – no matter how many prior laurels she may have – will fail. Does that mean our retained search firms will lose business? No, Directors seldom have backgrounds strong on executive development, though many have had nominal responsibility for the function; few have actually done the details. Retained search firms are expert on helping identify talent and can be a superb resource for a Board in managing a succession plan by providing the external, unbiased advice to the Board in the succession planning process. It hopefully does mean that they spend less of their time working on crisis CEO replacement projects. And if that crisis executive recruitment event occurs, the search firm will be even more effective as they will have in-depth knowledge of the management team strengths and weaknesses to recruit the best executive – or Director -- for the organization. EOM
October 14, 2008 1:27 PM